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Summary box
 ► The Lesotho public–private partnership (PPP) is an 
ambitious attempt to outsource new healthcare fa-
cilities and a broad range of clinical services.
 ► At the contract’s half-way point, the quality of ser-
vices delivered is relatively high, but the costs 
to government have been greater than had been 
forecast.
 ► The Ministry of Health has limited capacity to plan, 
procure, manage and pay for the contract, undermin-
ing its ability to meet wider health system objectives.
 ► Policy actors that promote PPPs should ensure that 
new proposals are subject to independent challenge, 
taking into account domestic capacity to manage 
complex contracts.
AbSTrACT
Many governments in sub-Saharan Africa are seeking 
to establish public–private partnerships (PPPs) for the 
financing and operation of new healthcare facilities and 
services. While there is a large empirical literature on PPPs 
in high-income countries, we know much less about their 
operation in low-income and middle-income countries. 
This paper seeks to inform debates about the use of 
PPPs in sub-Saharan Africa by describing the planning 
and operation of a high-profile case in Maseru, Lesotho. 
The paper highlights several beneficial impacts of the 
transaction, including the achievement of high clinical 
standards, alongside a range of key challenges—in 
particular, the higher-than-anticipated costs to the Ministry 
of Health. Governments have budget-related incentives 
to promote the use of PPPs—even in cases in which they 
may threaten financial sustainability in the long term. To 
address this, future proposals for PPPs need to be exposed 
to more effective scrutiny and challenge, taking into 
account state capacity to proficiently manage and pay for 
contracted services.
InTroduCTIon
Many governments in sub-Saharan Africa are 
seeking to establish public–private partner-
ships (PPPs) for the delivery of new health 
facilities and services.1 While there is a large 
empirical literature on PPPs in high-income 
countries, we know much less about their 
operation in low-income and middle-income 
countries (LMICs).2 This paper seeks to 
inform debates about the appropriate future 
role of PPPs in such contexts by describing 
the procurement, management and impacts 
of a PPP in Maseru, Lesotho, incorporating 
the part-financing, construction and opera-
tion of a 425-bed hospital, a gateway facility 
and three ‘filter’ clinics. The author was 
commissioned by the World Bank to assess 
the implementation of the PPP. This work, 
conducted between January and September 
2013,3 included interviews with govern-
ment officials, Tšepong staff and individuals 
involved in managing the contract. Along-
side the academic literature (outlined in 
section 2), this initial research had helped 
to shape the research questions addressed 
in this paper—though the data collected as 
part of that assignment are confidential and 
are not reported. The present paper is based 
on public documents alongside data obtained 
from key stakeholders through requests for 
specific information.
The deal was initiated by the Government of 
Lesotho and the International Finance Corpo-
ration (the private sector financing arm of the 
World Bank), which described the transaction 
as “an innovative and sustainable model for 
governments and the private sector to collab-
orate in delivering better health services… 
across sub-Saharan Africa”.4 The contract was 
signed in October 2008 by the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) and Tšepong—a consortium 
of investors led by Netcare, a South African 
healthcare company.4 The deal is ambitious 
in terms of the range of activities outsourced 
to the private sector—including the respon-
sibility to provide new healthcare facilities 
alongside a range of primary, secondary and 
tertiary care services (table 1).4 The present 
analysis was conducted half-way through the 
contract period—which, assuming it runs its 
full length, will terminate in December 2026.3
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Table 1 A typology of hospital public–private partnerships (PPPs)1
PPP category
Common term (countries in the sub-
Saharan Africa region where the model 
is being considered or implemented)11 Definition
Services Operating contract (Kenya, Uganda, 
Lesotho)
A private entity is brought in to operate and deliver publicly 
funded healthcare in a public facility
Facility/finance Private Finance Initiative, PPP, P3 (Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, South Africa)
A private entity is contracted to design, build, finance and 
maintain a hospital. Most clinical services within the facility 
continue to be provided by the public sector
Combined PPP (Benin, Lesotho, Nigeria) A private entity is contracted to design, build, finance and 
maintain a hospital, and provide core healthcare services under 
public financing
The analysis begins in section 2 (below) with a brief 
overview of the theoretical and empirical research on 
PPPs in high-income countries. This defines the frame-
work for the investigation of the Lesotho case, the find-
ings from which are presented in section 3, and which 
focus on (1) the financial features of the transaction, 
(2) the procurement process through which it was estab-
lished, (3) the management of the contract and (4) the 
annual costs of the deal to the MoH. Finally, in section 
4, the key lessons of the Lesotho experience are drawn 
out to provide an assessment of the future role of PPPs in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
LITerATure on THe CoSTS And benefITS of PPPS
In this paper, we define PPPs as long-term contracts 
between a public and a private entity in which the latter 
is responsible for delivering new healthcare facilities and 
services. In PPPs of this kind, the private entity earns an 
income stream from a performance-adjusted ‘unitary 
fee’, paid by the public entity, alongside user fees (where 
applicable). Contracts usually last for more than 15 years, 
but can last longer.5 Governments often favour the use 
of PPPs over public procurement because they provide 
access to private capital and thus allow the impact on 
public budgets of any related up-front expenditures to 
be deferred. However, the result is a long-term financial 
commitment—to repay the private capital with interest, 
and pay service costs and the expected profits of the 
private companies involved.
The economic case for using the PPP model over a 
‘conventional’ public procurement resides in its ability to 
transfer the risks of infrastructure and service delivery to 
the private sector, resulting in a lower risk-adjusted cost to 
the state—that is, better value for money.5 Theoretically, 
this transfer is achieved in three ways. First, the payment 
to the private sector is made as, when and to the extent that 
facilities and services are made available to users. Failure 
to achieve these outcomes results in reduced payments to 
the private sector. Second, the private sector’s profits are 
determined by its ability to minimise costs—for example, 
by exploiting economies of scope across the ‘bundled’ 
range of activities under its control (design, construc-
tion, maintenance, service delivery etc)—in ways that are 
impossible under direct public procurement. Third, a 
degree of contestability during procurement constrains the 
state’s future costs by eliminating excess profits, enabling 
the state to capture a share of the efficiencies secured 
through risk transfer and bundling.5
In practice, these mechanisms do not always function. 
The extent to which they do so varies between contexts. 
To ensure the private sector’s revenues are determined by 
its performance, government must be able to (1) write a 
comprehensive contract with clearly defined outcomes, (2) 
establish effective processes for monitoring and verifying 
performance, and (3) impose deductions and penalties 
whenever performance falls short. To generate contest-
ability, a government must be able to ensure competitive 
tension in procurement (which may not always be feasible 
given that, in many contexts, there will be few firms with 
sufficient capacity to undertake the full range of services 
over a long period), while bidders must have access to effi-
cient capital markets.6 In reality, achieving contestability 
during PPP procurements has been rare in high-income 
countries, and the cost of capital has been higher than the 
risk-adjusted rate on government debt.6
The model has also been shown to generate a distinct set 
of incentive problems. As referred to above, the upfront 
costs of PPPs are often not recorded on government 
spending or borrowing statistics. Consequently, the use of 
the PPP model generates a short-term addition to public 
sector capital budgets compared with the use of conven-
tional procurement (in which expenditure on construction 
is recorded as it is incurred).6 There has been a tendency 
for public authorities to see private capital as a ‘free good’ 
and to overinvest through PPPs.7 A common finding in the 
literature is that projects deemed affordable at the point of 
contract subsequently create financial problems for public 
authorities—that is, once new healthcare facilities are oper-
ational and the invoices fall due.7
Overall, the research on PPPs in high-income countries 
generates four key insights for analysing the appropriate 
future role of this model in sub-Saharan Africa. First, 
there is a tendency for states to overinvest via off-budget 
private financing, resulting in projects of a scale and a 
cost that can ultimately threaten the financial sustain-
ability of health systems. This is a real concern where 
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Table 2 Details of funding sources, revenues and 
returns*15
Sources of capital expenditure 
April 2007 Maloti 
(million)† %
Government grant (excluding 
VAT)
400 34.3
Commercial debt—drawdowns 589.83 50.6
Commercial debt—capitalised 
interest
70.62 6.1
Junior debt—DBSA and 
Netcare
93.68 8
Shareholders’ contribution
Equity—local firms 6.25 0.5
Equity—Netcare 4.16 0.4
Total private finance 765 65.7
Total 1165 100
Private sector revenues and 
returns
%
The unitary fee 255.55   
Equity IRR (after advance 
company tax)
  25.2
Interest rate on ‘junior’ debt   13.1
Interest rate on senior debt   11.62
*Errors due to rounding.
†1 Maloti=US$0.12 (2018).
DBSA, Development Bank of Southern Africa; IRR, internal rate of 
return.
there is a lack of capacity to take long-term spending 
commitments into account when preparing budgets, as 
is the case in most countries in the region.8 Second, the 
prospects for securing value for money depend on the 
state’s contracting expertise. To transfer risk appropri-
ately, state officials must be able to specify, in a compre-
hensive and enforceable contract, their goals over a long 
period of time, and design and enforce a payment mech-
anism that links private sector revenues to those goals. 
Third, value for money depends on there being a good 
level of competition in procurement. Once contracts are 
signed, the public sector must, finally, be able to establish 
a robust monitoring regime to ensure that the outputs 
being paid for are, in fact, being achieved.
Such competencies are lacking in some, perhaps most, 
LMICs in sub-Saharan Africa.9 On behalf of the World 
Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) analyses coun-
tries with regard to their capacity to undertake PPP proj-
ects, taking regulatory, institutional and operational 
competencies into account. Its most recent report on the 
African continent included an assessment of capacity for 
12 LMICs in sub-Saharan Africa, summarising the results 
in scores of between 0 and 4 (4=best).10 Four of the 
studied countries (Angola, Cameroon, DRC and Nigeria) 
received a score of 1; seven a score of 2 (Cote D’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) 
and just one (South Africa) had a score of 3.
Even where such capacity exists, low levels of contest-
ability between bidders and high private finance costs 
are likely to inflate contract prices, just as they have in 
high-income countries (though there is debate about 
whether these costs can be offset through the efficiency 
benefits of having private capital at risk).11 The impacts 
of these factors are likely to be more severe in LMICs 
because equity investors will require additional margins 
for political and macroeconomic risks. In addition, the EIU 
2015 report considers countries’ access to markets for 
debt capital. All countries except Kenya (2) and South 
Africa (4) received a score of 0 or 1 on this indicator, 
suggesting that in most countries long-term debt capital 
will either be unavailable or available only at a very high 
cost. In this respect, it is worth noting that the conces-
sional financing on which LMICs in sub-Saharan Africa 
rely for most of their ‘conventional’ public procurement 
carries very low interest rates (often 0%–1%), and repay-
ments are usually stretched over 30–38 years, including a 
grace period of 5–10 years.12
THe LeSoTHo PPP ConTrACT
In January 2007, the Government of Lesotho initi-
ated the tender to replace the ageing Queen Elizabeth 
II hospital. On 27 October 2008, it signed a contract 
with Tšepong, a consortium led by Netcare, a company 
based in South Africa, to design, build, part-finance and 
operate a 425-bed tertiary hospital (the Queen ‘Mamo-
hato Memorial Hospital) in the capital city, Maseru, and 
a gateway clinic adjacent to the hospital. The project also 
refurbished and re-equipped three ‘filter’ clinics, also 
located in the capital at Qoaling, Mabote and Likotsi, 
that would manage patient referrals to the hospital.13
At the time the contract was signed, the upfront capital 
cost of the project was estimated to be M1.165 billion 
(US$84 million in 2007 dollars) (table 2).14 Construction 
was to last 2 years and be followed by a 16-year operational 
period in which Tšepong would maintain the facilities and 
manage all clinical and non-clinical services within them. 
During this period, Tšepong would receive a ‘unitary fee’ 
from the government, set to cover all expected opera-
tional costs plus a return to debt and equity. The fee was 
set at M255.6 million (US$18.4 million in 2007 dollars).14 
Use of the facility would be free for patients, except for a 
small co-payment for some services, 90% of which would 
transfer to the MoH.14
The contract required both the government and 
Tšepong to contribute to the upfront capital costs.14 
Public capital of M400 million was provided, and private 
capital of M765 million financed the rest. As is normal for 
a PPP, the majority of the capital cost that was financed 
by the private sector did not score in measures of govern-
ment expenditure or borrowing.9 Of the amount that 
was privately financed, a loan provided by the Develop-
ment Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) accounted for the 
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Table 3 Comparison of financial values between RfBAFO and financial close14 15
Financial variables
Financial values expected at RfBAFO (30 
October 2007)
Financial values recorded at financial close 
(20 March 2009)*
Capital expenditure M500 million M1165 million
Public vs private financing M400/M100 million (80% public vs 20% private) M400/M764.5 million (34.3% public vs 65.7% 
private)
Expected unitary fee M180.4 million M255.6 million
*Note all figures are in 7 April 2007 monetary values.
majority, at an annual interest rate of 11.65%. The DBSA 
and Netcare also provided loans at a rate of 13.1%.14
Finally, Netcare and a group of local investors provided 
share capital (ie, equity) of M10.41 million. Netcare was 
the largest individual shareholder.14 When the contract 
was signed, the forecast internal rate of return—analo-
gous to an annual interest rate—on shareholder capital 
was 25.2%. It should be noted, however, that the actual 
returns may have been higher or lower than this rate (as 
this information is not in the public domain).
The weighted rate of return on these sources of capital 
are, as expected, far higher than would have been the 
case on the concessional funding on which Lesotho, in 
common with most other governments in the region, 
relies for ‘conventional’ public procurements. (The 
average interest rate on the government’s debt in 
2011/2012 was 0.6%, for example.)9
The procurement process
Two consortia, both anchored by South African hospital 
operators (Netcare and Life Healthcare), submitted 
responses to the government’s Request for Proposals 
(RfP).15 At the end of this process, it was determined that 
neither twice daily was compliant, and in October 2007 
the government asked for more detailed bids in a request 
for Best and Final Offers (RfBAFO).15 This document 
highlights that, at this point in the procurement process, 
the government was proposing a project that was materi-
ally different to the one implemented.
The notable points that emerge from this comparison 
are as follows (see table 3):
1. In the RfBAFO, the expected capital cost is recorded 
as M500 million, including VAT. This is less than half 
the final cost of M1.165 billion.15 It appears that, after 
publication of the RfBAFO, the government decid-
ed to add a further filter clinic, a gateway clinic and 
additional services, such as a neonatal intensive care 
unit, laparoscopy, neurosurgery and MRI facilities, to 
the specification of the contract. Therefore, the more 
than 100% increase in the expected capital cost was 
negotiated between the parties in the absence of any 
competition tension in bidding.
2. At the time that the RfBAFO was published, it was ex-
pected by the government that its capital budget of 
M400 million, including VAT, would be sufficient to 
finance some 80% of the capital costs of the project. 
In other words, it was expected that only one fifth of the 
capital would need to be raised by Tšepong. In fact, 
as table 2 shows, the scheme actually implemented 
was mostly financed by private capital (65.7% private 
against 34.3% public finance),14 highlighting the ex-
tent of the changes that took place in the final phases 
of negotiations—not just to the output specification 
and the price but to the extent of private involvement 
in the contract.
3. In the RfBAFO, the government recorded the maxi-
mum fee it could afford at M180.4 million per year, 
excluding VAT.15 In contrast, the financial model spec-
ifies the initial unitary fee as M255.6 million, exclud-
ing VAT—an increase of 42%.14
The government’s capacity to manage the contract
The three filter clinics began operating in May 2010 
and the Queen ‘Mamohato Memorial Hospital opened 
in October 2011.16 The services delivered in these facil-
ities include a broad range of specialisms, omitting 
certain interventions that would normally be expected 
in a national referral hospital, such as transplants, joint 
replacements, dialysis, planned cardiac surgery, chemo-
therapy and radiotherapy, obstetrics and gynaecology, 
plastic surgery and dentistry.13 The contract specifies a 
minimum and maximum number of patients to be treated 
per year—for inpatients 16 500 to 20 000 and outpatients 
258 000 to 310 000.13 It defines extra fees to be paid if 
the upper parameter is exceeded. These are M9491.64 
(including VAT) per inpatient and M57 (including VAT) 
per outpatient (all in 2007 prices).13
The MoH is allowed to monitor performance—but, in 
practice, has not established sufficient capacity to do so. 
As of 2015, only two full-time MoH employees managed 
all outsourced services, collectively accounting for 52% 
of the total health budget of the country in that year.16 In 
the absence of effective monitoring, the payment mech-
anism outlined in the contract is made redundant. For 
example, the government has been unable to impose 
deductions and penalties when the private sector’s 
performance has fallen short of contracted standards.3 
However, the arrangements for the governance of the 
services also include an interesting ‘back-stop’ arrange-
ment. Tšepong must obtain and maintain accreditation 
by COHSASA, the Council for Health Service Accredita-
tion of Southern Africa, and if it fails to do so, the MoH 
has a right to terminate the contract.17 COHSASA eval-
uates standards across 32 domains within the hospital 
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Table 4 Forecast and actual fees (invoiced and paid) under the public–private partnership contract, in Maloti (M)14 16
Financial year
Unitary fees as 
forecast in the 
contract (net of 
VAT) (M million)
Invoiced amounts 
(M million)
Actual expenditures 
(net of VAT) (M million)
Invoiced amounts 
minus forecast 
unitary fees) (M 
million)
Actual 
expenditures 
minus forecast 
unitary fees (M 
million)
2012/2013 352.86 435.55 409.86 82.69 57
2013/2014 377.56 575.3 463.58 197.74 86.02
2014/2015 403.99 598.12 482.44 194.13 78.45
2015/2016 432.27 641.99 439.42 209.72 7.15
and assesses these as being either ‘compliant’, ‘partially 
compliant’, ‘non-compliant’ or ‘not applicable’.
To achieve accreditation, a compliance rate of 80% against 
International Health Standards is required, with all areas 
designated as ‘critical’ being compliant. Tšepong obtained 
COHSASA accreditation in November 2013 with an overall 
score of 94%.3 This has not previously been attained by 
any public sector hospital in sub-Saharan Africa (except in 
South Africa). This provides evidence that, despite the lack 
of effective use of the contract and payment mechanism, 
the hospital is delivering a high standard of care by histor-
ical and regional standards. It is important to acknowledge, 
however, that the process of accreditation is separate from 
the contract itself, and without an effective payment mecha-
nism, it is difficult to compare the contract’s costs and bene-
fits—that is, value for money.
The scale and predictability of the costs to government
It has already been noted that the government chose to 
proceed with the contract despite a substantial increase 
in the annual unitary fee—from M180.4 million during 
bidding to M255.6 million at the point the contract was 
signed. The costs to government have also continued to 
increase beyond those forecasted during the post-con-
tractual period. One reason for this is that the unitary 
fee is linked to inflation, by an index referenced to the 
Lesotho Consumer Price Index (CPI) and a composite 
index consisting of Lesotho CPI plus the difference 
between South African Medical CPIX and South African 
CPIX.3 The adjustment is applied to the entire unitary 
fee, even though around 30% of Tšepong’s costs relate 
to financing, and are unaffected by price changes .14 
The effect of indexation was to increase the fee by 68%, 
from M255.6 million in 2008/2009 to M439.4 million in 
2015/2016 (net of VAT).
In addition, the amounts paid to Tšepong by govern-
ment during the operation of the contract have been 
higher than the increases in the unitary fee, for two main 
reasons:
1. The treatment of patients has exceeded expectations. In each 
year of operation (at the time of writing), the number 
of patients treated has exceeded by several thousands 
the upper parameters for inpatients and outpatients. 
This allows Tšepong to levy higher payments, as de-
scribed. In 2011 and 2012, Tšepong chose to defer fees 
for these treatments. However, it did elect to invoice 
the government for additional treatments from the 
beginning of 2013, and patient numbers exceeded the 
upper parameter by about 25% in that year.16
2. The government has not been able to pay the unitary fee on 
time. This results in extra costs as Tšepong has the 
right to charge interest on amounts outstanding. In 
addition, due to late payments, there have been sever-
al instances of Tšepong defaulting on its debts—and 
the penalties associated with these are passed to the 
government in higher invoiced fees.3
As table 4 shows, the combination of these factors has 
led to large differences between the amounts paid to, or 
invoiced by, Tšepong, compared with the unitary fees 
forecast in the original financial model contained within 
the contract. In addition, the MoH has paid considerably 
less than the amounts invoiced (eg, in 2015/2016, in 
which all payments due for treatments above the upper 
demand parameter went unpaid).16 This raises a question 
about whether the shortfall in payments due will, at some 
stage, have to be corrected, with additional and poten-
tially serious financial implications for the MoH, and its 
ability to meet health need in the country.
Analysis of the future role of PPPs in the LMICs of sub-
Saharan Africa
The experience of the Lesotho PPP is mixed. New facili-
ties were delivered to time and to budget. The quality 
of clinical services has been high by both historical and 
regional standards. However, there is no evidence that 
these outcomes resulted from the contract itself. Instead, it 
appears that the COHSASA accreditation process—which 
focuses on clinical standards in particular specialisms 
and has limited overlap with the key performance indica-
tors of the contract—has been crucial. Accreditation is a 
regulatory instrument more commonly applied to private 
hospitals than public hospitals operating under contract. 
However, as an additional source of performance pressure 
for the private entity, this is a feature of the Lesotho expe-
rience that may be replicated elsewhere, especially when 
public purchasers are unable to enforce contracts that can, 
alone, generate good value for money.
In Lesotho, the effect of such costs have been to channel 
resources towards hospital services in the capital and away 
from primary care settings in rural areas. When accounting 
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for district population, per capita expenditure on health 
in Maseru (at M995 per capita) was in 2015 double the 
amount of the second-place district, Qacha’s Nek (M460).16 
Currently, Tšepong’s doctors account for close to half of all 
those in Lesotho.16 There is pressure on the government 
to reallocate clinicians to underserved districts to broaden 
access to healthcare, but it is apparent that the scale of the 
payment to Tšepong—which accounted for some 60% of 
the total payments made by the MoH to healthcare providers 
in 2015/20167—makes progress on this agenda harder to 
achieve.
Many of the challenges experienced in Lesotho were 
predictable in light of the existing empirical literature on 
PPPs, which points to the importance of state capacity, 
contestable markets, and degree of access to capital 
markets as key determinants of long-term costs and bene-
fits. None of these were adequate in Lesotho, and existing 
analyses suggest this inadequacy will be common among 
other LMICs in the region. Development agencies and 
national authorities considering the use of PPPs in such 
contexts therefore need to acknowledge these lacunae in 
their assessments of the role this model should play.
At a minimum, governments that promote such initia-
tives should ensure they invest in dedicated and specialist 
human resources for planning, designing, negotiating and 
managing complex contracts. Where multilateral banks 
are involved in such plans (as is often the case), it would 
be useful to earmark funds for capacity-building in these 
areas (eg, to enable permanent staff for PPP centres of 
expertise to be recruited and trained), in addition to the 
project loans and/or transactions advice that are routinely 
provided.
In Lesotho, private finance filled a gap between capital 
funds available and those necessary to deliver a desired 
project—but the longer-term impacts were marginal-
ised in planning. To address the potential for poor deci-
sion-making on PPPs, new proposals should be exposed to 
challenge by agencies genuinely independent of projects. 
The need for scrutiny goes beyond the mere consideration 
of fiscal impacts at the whole-of-government level (the 
recently developed World Bank Group—IMF PPP Fiscal 
Risk Assessment Model tool can be used to assess implications 
at this level),1 and consider the likely impacts on the health 
sector specifically, and its ability to sustain equitable access 
to needed healthcare.
ConCLuSIon
In this paper, we have highlighted several aspects of the 
Lesotho experience that are instructive for practitioners 
elsewhere. While PPPs may enhance quality of clinical 
services, weaknesses in the state’s capacity to run compet-
itive procurements, write complete contracts and budget 
for them proficiently generate risks. Governments in 
sub-Saharan Africa need to strengthen crucial elements of 
capacity to mitigate such risks. Even with additional capacity 
in place, it may be that the regulatory instruments—such as 
accreditation—can play a useful role as an additional source 
of performance pressure. The experience of Lesotho also 
underlines the central role of independent scrutiny, both 
before and during procurement, to ensure that projects do 
not breach their affordability ceilings.
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